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TO FIRST AMENDMENT REVIEW
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
In Procunier v. Martinez1 the Supreme Court held that certain
regulations promulgated by the California Department of Correc-
tions which authorized censorship 2 of prisoners' personal corres-
pondence3 were unconstitutional. While the Court bypassed the is-
sue of the quantum of first amendment rights retained by inmates
with regard to mail,4 the clear effect of the holding is to mandate
first amendment review when a challenge is lodged against statutes
or regulations which attempt to impinge upon written prisoner
communication with the outside world.
5
A class action which challenged regulations dealing with mail
censorship and attorney-client interviews conducted by law stu-
dents and legal paraprofessionals 6 was brought on behalf of all in-
1. 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the
Court; Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas concurred.
2. Censorship in the context of this case means the authority to delete
portions of letters, to refuse to mail inmate correspondence, or to prohibit
delivery of mail to prisoners. Procunier does not ban the reading and in-
spection of mail. See note 70 and accompanying text infra.
3. The district court defined personal correspondence as all mail
other than letters to members of the California Bar or public officeholders.
Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The appropriate-
ness of the regulations relating to personal correspondence was the only
first amendment issue before the Supreme Court. See note 77 and accom-
panying text infra.
4. 416 U.S. at 409. See notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text infra.
5. 416 U.S. at 413. See notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text infra.
6. Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
The scope of this Note is restricted to the censorship issue, but the case
is also important for the way the attorney-client issue was resolved. Ad-
ministrative Rule MV-IV-02 provided, in pertinent part:
Investigators for an attorney-of-record will be confined to not more
than two. Such investigators must be licensed by the State or must
be members of the State Bar. Designation must be made in writ-
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mates in penal institutions under the jurisdiction of the California
Department of Corrections. The policy which the regulations im-
plemented was set forth in Rule 2401:7
The sending and receiving of mail is a privilege, not
a ricrht, and any violation of the rules governing mail
privileges either by you and your correspondents may cause
suspension of mail privileges.
In furtherance of the stated policy of Rule 2401, Rule 12018 banned
correspondence in which prisoners unduly complained or magnified
grievances, Rule 1205 (d) 9 prohibited as contraband any writings
containing inflammatory political, racial, and religious beliefs
might tend to subvert prison security, and Rule 2402 (8) 10 proscribed
mail pertaining to criminal activity or obscenity. The task of en-
forcing the regulations was delegated to the mailroom staff and
other prison employees who routinely screened incoming and out-
going mail for violations. Significantly, the rules provided the only
standards to be used in deciding whether particular correspondence
contravened prison regulations or policy. When a letter was found
to be improper, the Department employee had the following op-
tions: (1) he could refuse to mail the letter and return it to the
inmate, (2) he could submit a disciplinary report, possibly leading
to suspension of mail privileges or more severe sanctions, or (3)
he could place a copy or summary of the letter's contents in the
prisoner's file where it would be available to committees which de-
ing by the attorney.
416 U.S. at 419. Employing a due process rationale, the Court stated that
the absolute ban on the use of law students and legal paranrofessionals by
attorneys constituted an unjustifiable restriction on the right of access to
the courts. 416 U.S. at 419. See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
7. 416 U.S. at 339 n.l.
8. Id. at n.2. Rule 1201 provided:
Inmate Behavior: Always conduct yourself in an orderly manner.
Do not fight or take part in horseplay or physical encounters except
as part of the regular athletic program. Do not agitate, unduly
complain, magnify grievances, or behave in any way which might
lead to violence.
The Court stated that the phrases "unduly complain" and "magnify griev-
ances" had always been applied to personal correspondence.
9. Id. at n.3. Rule 1205 (d) provided:
The following is contraband:
(d) any writings or voice recordings expressing inflammatory
political, racial, religious, or other views or beliefs when not
in the immediate possession of the originator, or when the
originator's possession is used to subvert prison discipline by
display or circulation.
10. Id. at 399-400. Rule 2402(8) stated that prisoners "may not send
or receive letters that pertain to criminal activity; are lewd, obscere, or
defamatory; contain foreign matter, or are otherwise inappropriate."
termined work and housing assignments and set a date for parole
eligibility.1
After rejecting an abstention argument asserted by the defend-
ants in their motion to dismiss the complaint, 12 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California proceeded to
the merits. The three-judge court initially held that prisoners
have a fundamental right to correspond which is protected by the
first amendment, and restrictions on that right must be reasonably
and necessarily related to a valid constitutional interest. 13 Conse-
quently, the court sustained the plaintiffs' overbreadth and vague-
ness arguments, since the regulations encroached upon the sphere
of protected expression and neglected to give fair notice of what
activities were prohibited.1 4 The regulations also failed to pass con-
stitutional muster for a third reason; procedural due process safe-
guards were nonexistent because no opportunity to review censor-
ship decisions was provided.15 Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment was granted in part, the court finding that Rules 1201,
1205 (d), and 2402 (8) violated the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.16 This decision was appealed, and the Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction.
17
At the outset of the Court's discussion, Justice Powell noted
the traditional hands-off attitude which federal courts have adopted
toward problems of prison administration and reform. 8 This pol-
11. Id. at 400.
12. 354 F. Supp. at 1095. The Supreme Court similarly rejected the
abstention argument, noting that comity considerations between state and
federal courts cannot, alone, provide grounds for abstention where there ex-
ists only the mere possibility that a state court might declare the regulations
unconstitutional. 416 U.S. at 401. The Court also brushed aside two addi-
tional reasons for abstention, raised for the first time on appeal, stating that
"we are mindful of the high cost of abstention when the federal constitu-
tional challenge concerns facial repugnance to the First Amendment." Id.
at 404.
13. 354 F. Supp. at 1097.
14. Id. at 1096-1097.
15. Id. at 1097. See notes 47 and 48 and accompanying text infra.
16. Id. at 1099. Moreover, the district court ordered defendants to
formulate new regulations in accordance with the opinion, reserving juris-
diction until proper rules were adopted.
17. Procunier v. Martinez, 412 U.S. 948 (1973).
18. 416 U.S. at 404. Justice Powell's statement of the hands-off policy
is particularly thoughtful and expresses neatly the various formulations
made by courts in the past:
Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal or-
der and discipline, for securing their institutions against unau-
thorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that
human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed
in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge
of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it
to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible
of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive
planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are pecul-
iarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches
of government.
416 U.S. at 404-405. Unfortunately, the hands-off policy has often been used
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icy is based partly upon deference to the expertise of corrections
officials and recognizes that courts are poorly equippped to deal
with serious difficulties in these areas.1 9 Nevertheless, the Court
stated that the hands-off approach is inappropriate when prison
regulations or practices impinge upon fundamental constitutional
rights.20 Procunier reflects a growing tendency on the part of the
federal judiciary to intervene in prison affairs.21 While this is laud-
able from the standpoint of prisoners' rights, it is not a trend with-
out its problems.
22
As a result of the historic reluctance of the courts to actively
intervene in prison affairs, a wide varety of approaches to the cen-
sorship issue had been adopted prior to Procunier.23 Many courts
to avoid reaching the merits of facially justiciable prisoner complaints. In
Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965), the court stated the once-un-
challenged rule:
Contrary to the apparent view of prisoners, and of appellant here,
the privilege which an individual may enjoy on the outside of writ-
ing whatever letters he desires, on whatever subject he sees fit, and
to whatever persons he chooses, is not one to which the law gives
an abstract reach into penal institutions.
Id. at 972. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
19. 416 U.S. at 405.
20. Id. at 405-406.
21. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
af 'd sub nor. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). These
cases extensively delved into constitutional challenges regarding all phases
of prison life. Mpuch progress has been made since the time when the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court held that the federal Bill of Rights did not apply to
prisoners because they were "slaves of the State." Ruffin v. The Common-
wealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
22. Justice Powell noted that the "burgeoning increase of frivolous
prisoner complaints" impairs the capacity of the criminal justice system to
deal with legitimate claims. 416 U.S. at 405 n.9. See also Dreyer v. Jalet,
349 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 479 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.
1973). Indeed, it cannot be seriously argued that the federal courts are the
proer agencies for premier consideration of petty inmate grievances. See,
e.g., Rhodes v. Sigler, 448 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1971) (controversy concerning
$2.46 in plaintiff's account); United States ex rel. Pope v. Hendricks, 326
F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (raincoat not returned to plaintiff, nor did
he receive two of the six dollars promised for participating in an unspeci-
fied medical program).
23. These decisions have inspired a plethora of scholarly comment.
See, e.g., Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 1192 (1973); Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 1150 (1973);
Brant, Prison Censorship Regulations Versus the Constitution: An Analy-
sis, 19 LOYOLA L. REV. 25 (1973); Singer, Censorship of Prisoners' Mail and
the Constitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051 (1970); Comment, Judicial Recognition
of Prisoners' Constitutional Right to Send and Receive Mail, 76 DICK. L.
REv. 775 (1972); Comment, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL.
L. REV. 407 (1967); Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment,
81 YALE L.J. 87 (1971).
were extremely reluctant to subject prison censorship regulations
to close constitutional scrutiny. In McCloskey v. Maryland,24 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that judicial review
of institutional disciplinary controls was highly impractical and
wholly unwarranted. Another federal court declared that it would
not exercise "inquisitorial" and disciplinary powers over state
prisons "even though [the inmate] may claim that the restrictions
placed upon his activities are in violation of his constitutional
rights."25 However, even those courts taking a strict view against
judicial intervention with the prison system have stated that under
certain exceptional circumstances, inmate complaints will be recog-
nized.
26
At the opposite end of the spectrum are cases such as Morales
v. Schmidt 2 where an equal protection analysis was applied. The
court invalidated prison censorship regulations because it found
that the state of Wisconsin failed to show a compelling interest for
treating prisoners differently than other members of society.28 Re-
cently, courts which are not disposed to accept the somewhat dis-
credited hands-off approach have been instituting first amendment
review and finding that prison censorship rules violate the Consti-
tution. In Carothers v. Follette,29 for example, the court used the
following test: 30
[WIe conclude that any prison regulation or practice
which restricts the right of free expression that a prisoner
would have enjoyed if he had not been imprisoned must
be related both reasonably and necessarily to the advance-
ment of some justifiable purpose of imprisonment.
In Procunier, Justice Powell emphasized that the existence of
these widely differing approaches was unfortunate because it led
to haphazard and inconsistent protection of first amendment inter-
ests. 1 Additionally, those persons charg-d with enforcing censor-
24. 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1974). See also Krupnick v. Crouse, 366 F.2d
851 (10th Cir. 1966).
25. United States ex rel. Cobb v. Maroney, 216 F. Supp. 910, 911 (W.D.
Pa. 1963), quoting United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WNNR, 209
F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1953).
26. See, e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965) (mail censor-
slip rules cannot discriminate against particular racial or religious groups).
27. 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.
1973).
28. Id. at 550. In reversing the holding of the district court, the court
of appeals also applied an equal protection analysis, but rejected the com-
pelling state interest test in favor of the less demanding rational relation-
ship standard. 489 F.2d at 1343. Cf. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 526 (5th
Cir. 1968); Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Preston
v. Thieszen, 341 F. Supp. 785 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
29. 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
30. Id. at 1024. Cf. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Lemon v. Zelker, 358 F. Supp. 554
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
31. 416 U.S. at 407.
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ship rules were unable to know what was required of them. 2 In
order to ameliorate these prior discrepancies and to establish more
uniform criteria for considering prisoner censorship complaints, the
Procunier Court employed a first amendment analysis.
33
The main issue in Procunier is simply stated: what is the ap-
propriate standard of review for prison regulations restricting free-
dom of speech? Unlike previous lower court decisions, the Court
in Procunier did not speak to the issue of prisoner first amendment
rights. Rather, Justice Powell rejected the common assumption
that a determination of inmate first amendment rights is necessary
to a decision of the constitutionality of the challenged regulations.
3 4
Instead, the Court used a narrower basis for its decision:
In the case of direct personal correspondence between
inmates and those who have a particularized interest in
communicating with them, mail censorship implicates more
than the right of prisoners.
Communication by letter is not accomplished by the
act of writing words on paper. Rather, it is effected only
when the letter is read by the addressee. Both parties to
the correspondence have an interest in securing that result,
and censorship of communication necessarily impinges on
the interest of each. Whatever the status of a prisoner's
claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it
is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.3 5
It follows from this reasoning that prison mail censorship problems
cannot be resolved by applying the one-time traditional rule that
inmate first amendment rights are not equal to those of civilians.3
32. Id.
33. The court did not discuss possible objections to censorship based
on the fourth amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. It
has been held that prisoners may be subjected to searches unimpeded by
the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15
(1919); Hayes v. United States, 367 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1966); Annot., 52
A.L.R.3d 548 (1973); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1958). These holdings must
be re-examined with respect to mail, in light of Procunier.
34. Cf. cases cited at note 30 supra. It appears that only one court
anticipated the approach that was used in Procunier. See Palmigiano v.
Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
35. 416 U.S. at 408. In other words, "the interests of the parties are
inextricably meshed," and first amendment considerations do not depend
on
whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended
recipient of a particular letter, for the addressee as well as the
sender of direct personal correspondence derives from the First and
Fourteenth Amendments a protection against unjustified govern-
mental interference with the intended communication.
Id. at 408-409.
36. Cf. Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970). The Court
noted that this rationale attempts to support an undemanding standard of
Therefore, the Court turned away from cases speaking in terms of
"prisoners' rights" and looked to decisions dealing with "the general
problem of restrictions on first amendment liberties imposed in fur-
therance of legitimate governmental activities."8 7
The Court relied heavily on three prior cases. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,38 the suspension
of students who wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam war
was invalidated, thereby striking a balance in favor of free speech
interests over the admitted need to maintain appropriate discipline
in the operation of schools. The Court held in Healy v. James"9
that while colleges have a legitimate interest in preventing disrup-
tion, they cannot withhold official recognition from a Students for
a Democratic Society chapter absent a showing that the student
members refused to accept reasonable regulations regarding their
conduct. A statute punishing draft card burning was upheld in
United States v. O'Brien; 40 the Court stated that governmental reg-
ulations potentially infringing on protected expression are constitu-
tionally permissible if the incidental restrictions are no greater than
necessary to the furtherance of a substantial governmental interest
which must be unrelated to the suppression of free speech.
A common thread which linked Tinker, Healy, and O'Brien was
the Court's emphasis on the legitimate, substantial governmental
interests asserted as the basis for imposing restrictions on the exer-
cise of first amendment rights. Applying the rationale of those
cases to Procunier, which arose in the context of prisons, Justice
Powell stated that the identifiable governmental intersts at stake
are (1) the preservation of internal order and discipline, (2) the
maintenance of security, and (3) rehabilitation.41 The Court next
review that is not properly cognizant of the first amendment rights of those
who correspond with prisoners. 416 U.S. at 409.
37. 416 U.S. at 409.
38. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Justice Fortas wrote that students and teach-
ers do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the
schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506. While school authorities have comprehensive
power to prescribe conduct, they cannot rely merely upon a fear or appre-
hension of disturbance which could result from the exercise of constitu-
tional rights. In the prison context, courts have displayed considerably less
reluctance in permitting corrections officials to base regulations which re-
strict potential free speech interests on fear or apprehension of inmate
abuse. Cf. Lamar v. Coffield, 353 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
39. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). While student activists are subject to reason-
able time, manner, and place restrictions, Justice Powell stated in Healy
that college officials must meet a heavy burden of proof to justify prior
restraint on the right to associate to further political beliefs. See National
Prisoners Reform Ass'n v. Sharkey, 347 F. Supp. 1234 (D.R.I. 1972).
40. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court indicated in Procunier that the dis-
tinction in O'Brien between "speech" and "non-speech" elements of a single
course of conduct has little relevance with respect to prison mail censorship.
416 U.S. at 411. However, it does not appear that the Court is treating mail
as "pure speech," with all the ramifications involved in that approach. See,
e.g., Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 936 (1970).
41. 416 U.S. at 412. For example, it would be justifiable to censor let-
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
proceeded to formulate a general standard against which any re-
strictions on inmate mail privileges must be tested.
First, it must be shown that the regulation or practice in ques-
tion furthers "an important governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression," 42 that is, security, order, or rehabilita-
tion. Second, "the limitations of First Amendment freedoms must
be no greater than necessary or essential to the protection of the
particular governmental interest involved. '43 Simply stated, the
regulation may not be overbroad 4 Measured against this two-
pronged test, the California rules failed to obtain the Court's ap-
proval. Since they authorized censorship of statements that "un-
duly complain" or "magnify grievances" or express "inflammatory
political, social, religious, or other views," 45 they clearly invited
prison officials to employ their own standards in deciding what ma-
terial was proscribed. The Court also rejected the regulations be-
cause they did not foster any of the three permissible objectives
of prison mail censorship-security, order, and rehabilitation. 46
Finally, the Court invalidated the rules for neglecting to attach
due process protection to censorship decisions. Since the first
amendments interests of prisoners and their correspondents are "lib-
erty" interests within the scope of the fourteenth amendment, they
must be shielded from arbitrary governmental interference. 47 Con-
sequently, the Court affirmed the holding of the district court
which imposed the following due process requirements: (1) notice
to the prisoner that a letter had been rejected, (2) opportunity to
ters containing plans for escape or proposed criminal activity. Id. at 413.
The Court did not address the question of the validity of a temporary limi-
tation on personal correspondence imposed as a disciplinary sanction for
violation of prison rules. Id. at 412, n.12. For general criticism of prison
censorship policy justifications, see Comment, The Right of Expression in
Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 407 (1967); Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the
First Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 87 (1971).
42. 416 U.S. at 413. As an example, the Court indicated that prison
officials could not censor letters simply to eliminate unflattering opinions
or factually inaccurate statements.
43. Id.
44. The Court is willing, however, to permit "some latitude in antici-
pating the probable consequences of allowing certain speech in a prison en-
vironment. .. ." Id. at 414.
45. See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
46. 416 U.S. at 415-416.
47. Id. at 418. Justice Douglas, concurring, emphasized the fourteenth
amendment as a basis for the decision, stating that:
Prisoners are still "persons" entitled to all constitutional rights ex-
cept and unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed in
the procedures that satisfy all of the requirements of due process.
Id. at 428. See Comment, The Convict's Voice-The Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Right to Establish Rights, 58 IowA L.R. 1323 (1973).
contest the decision, and (3) review of complaints by a prison offi-
cial other than the original censor.
48
As mentioned previously, 49 Justice Powell did not rely on cases
dealing with the scope of prisoner first amendment rights as the
basis for the decision on mail censorship. In other contexts, how-
ever, courts have upheld first amendment claims in prisoner civil
rights litigation. The analysis usually begins with the premise that
the inmate "retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."50
Perhaps the area in which first amendment rights have been
most vigorously supported is freedom of religion. The Supreme
Court has stated at least twice that prisoners retain certain ele-
ments of this right despite incarceration.5 1 Clearly, prison officials
cannot discriminate on the basis of religious beliefs. 52 Nevertheless,
the mere fact of confinement imposes restrictions on the free exer-
cise of religious practices.
53
The courts have held that inmates similarly retain various
other rights derived from the first amendment. In Gray v.
Creamer,14 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declared that
a cause of action was stated by prisoners who alleged that they had
been punished for publishing a newspaper containing poems, as-
trology forecasts, religious expressions, and editorial statements.
The court in Diamond v. Thompson" upheld the right of prisoners
to discuss their political views subject to reasonable time, manner,
and place restrictions. In National Prisoners Reform Association
v. Sharkey5" inmates were granted a temporary restraining order
48. 416 U.S. at 418-419. See also Monaghan, First Amendment Due
Process, 83 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1970).
49. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
50. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
51. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546
(1964). Among the many complaints that have been raised by prisoners
are: (1) restricting the holding of religious services, (2) refusing access
to ministers of the faith and religious materials, (3) refusing to provide
special religious diets, and (4) treating failure to participate in religious
activities as mitigating against the granting of parole. See H. KEEPER &
J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 387-388 (1974).
52. Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967). In Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319 (1972), the Court held that reasonable opportunities must be af-
forded to all prisoners to exercise religious freedom, even though an insti-
tution does not have to provide every sect with identical facilities or per-
sonnel. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1296 (1967).
53. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 892 (1964); Sharp v. Sigler, 277 F. Supp. 963 (D. Neb. 1967), aff'd,
408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969). But cf. Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th
Cir. 1970).
54. 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972).
55. 364 F. Supp. 659 (M.D. Ala. 1973). But see Lamar v. Coffield, 353
F. Supp. 1081 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (not unreasonable to prohibit speech in the
prison mess hall).
56. 347 F. Supp. 1234 (D.R.I. 1972). The court derived the standard
of review from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See note 40
and accompanying text supra.
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and a preliminary injunction prohibiting prison officials from inter-
fering with their meetings, after the court held that a cluster of
constitutional rights was involved, including freedom to associate
and to petition for a redress of grievances, and equal protection of
the laws. Additionally, other courts have sustained the right of
prisoners to order and receive newspapers and similar publica-
tions.5
7
Procunier, in fact, is couched in general first amendment lan-
guage. But since the Court specifically reserved the issue of the
"extent to which an individual's right to free speech survives incar-
ceration,"58 it is appropriate to examine the degree of constitutional
protection which attaches to mail among the general population.
This comparison will further clarify the Court's rationale in the in-
stant case.
Historically, the applicability of the first amendment to sending
and receiving mail was not always clear. Many cases held that the
postal power granted to Congress by the Constitution5 9 embraced
regulation of the entire postal system, including the power to deter-
mine what could or could not be carried in the mails.60 This doc-
trine has since been discarded. Two recent Supreme Court deci-
sions suggest that a first amendment right to send and receive mail
may be emerging. In Blount v. Rizzi,61 the Court struck down a
section of the Postal Reorganization Act which permitted the Post-
master General to halt the use of the mails for commerce in alleg-
edly obscene materials because the statutory scheme did not provide
adequate procedural safeguards against undue inhibition of pro-
tected speech. Similarly, in Lamont v. Postmaster General,6 2 the
Court invalidated a statute requiring the post office department to
detain and destroy unsealed mail determined to be communist prop-
aganda from foreign countries unless the addressee specifically in-
dicated his desire to receive the mail. This was held to be an uncon-
stitutional limitation on the addressee's first amendment rights.
3
57. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Manicone v. Corso, 365 F. Supp. 577
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F. Supp. 1265 (D.N.H. 1972);
Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th
Cir. 1971).
58. 416 U.S. 408.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
60. See, e.g., Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904); Ex
parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878);
McCrossen v. United States, 339 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1965).
61. 400 U.S. 410 (1971). See also Sigler, Freedom of the Mails: A
Developing Right, 54 GEO. L.J. 30 (1965).
62. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
63. Id. at 305. Both Blount and Lamont relied heavily on the oft-
Drawing upon Blount and Lamont for support, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit has held that statutes affecting expres-
sion are constitutional under the postal power only if they are spe-
cific, narrow, and do not interfere with protected speech.
4 Of
course, speech which is not protected by the first amendment is sub-
ject to regulation,6 5 and "[i] t follows as a corollary that these utter-
ances can be censored from the mail.
66
In view of these recent pronouncements and the censorship dis-
cussion in Procunier, it appears that prisoner mail may no longer
be treated much differently than ordinary civilian mail, at least
with regard to the contents of correspondence. Justice Powell com-
mented favorably on the rules promulgated by the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, implying that similar regulations could withstand the
constitutional scrutiny imposed by the two-pronged test set forth
in the opinion of the Court.67 The federal prison rules permit cor-
respondence to be rejected for inclusion of the following kinds of
material: (1) anything which might violate postal regulations such
as threats, blackmail, or contraband, (2) discussion of criminal ac-
tivity, (3) evidence that the inmate is conducting a business from
his cell, (4) correspondence in code, or (5) correspondence in a for-
eign language, subject to exceptions when necessary.68 These rules
are far more specific and narrowly drawn than the ones which pro-
voked the original complaint in Procunier.9
Although Procunier severely restricts the one-time broad cen-
quoted statement of Justice Holmes, dissenting in United States ex rel. Mil-
waukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921):
"The United States may give up the post office when it sees fit, but while
it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech
as the right to use our tongues. . . ." Cf. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943) (first amendment embraces right to distribute and receive
handbills).
64. Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 936 (1970). Accord, Associated Students, U. Cal. at Riverside v.
Attorney General, 368 F. Supp. 11 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Atlanta Coorerative
News Project v. United States Postal Service, 350 F. Supp. 234 (N.D. Ga.
1972).
65. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942):
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention of which has never been thought to raise
any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting words"-
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-572.
66. Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970). Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S.
728 (1970) (obscenity); Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178 (1948)
(fraudulent puzzle scheme); Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 897 (1970) (mail cover); McCrossen v. United
States, 339 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1965) (defamatory statements on envelope);
Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (libel).
67. See notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text supra.
68. 416 U.S. at 414-415, n.14.
69. See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
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sorship authority possessed by prison officials, there remains, how-
ever, one crucial distinction between mailing rights of prisoners and
the general population--each and every piece of personal mail going
to and coming from inmates may be opened and read by corrections
employees. Justice Marshall pointed this out in his concurring
opinion.70 Noting the chilling effect of allowing prison officials to
read inmate mail, he would require a showing of a substantial gov-
ernmental interest merely to open and read letters.71 The concur-
ring Justices7 2 would reach the first amendment issue which the
majority sidestepped 73 and would hold that inmates do, indeed,
have a first amendment right to use the mails, subject only to lim-
ited exceptions.
74
Perhaps this sheds light on why the Court handled the constitu-
tional issue in terms of the rights of prisoners' correspondents. If
it follows, as Justice Marshall contended, that a finding that pris-
oners themselves possess first amendment rights to send and receive
mail bars even the reading of their mail by corrections officials,
then it was much easier for the Court to sanction the reading of
the letters if it used the rationale it, in fact, adopted. Of course,
the Court was not reluctant to permit the reading and inspection
of mail even though correspondents' first amendment rights were
implicated. Nevertheless, by avoiding the direct issue of prisoner
first amendment rights, the Court was able to bypass the difficult
problems to which Justice Marshall alluded in his concurring opin-
ion.
75
70. 416 U.S. at 423-426.
71. Id. at 423. Justice Marshall accepted the contention that "the ex-
igencies of governing persons in prisons are different from and greater than
those in governing persons without." Id. at 424. He felt, however, that
the legitimate governmental interests of security, safety, discipline, and re-
habilitation are not sufficient to permit the reading of inmate mail when
less drastic means could be employed to achieve those goals. For example,
there was no proof that physical tests such as fluorescoping letters would
not be equally as effective as opening and reading mail to stem the traffic
in contraband. Id. at 424-425. He went on to state:
Perhaps the most obvious victim of the indirect censorship effected
by a policy of allowing prison authorities to read inmate mail is
criticism of prison administration. The threat of identification and
reprisal inherent in allowing correctional authorities to read pris-
oner mail is not lost on inmates who might otherwise criticize their
jailors. The mails are one of the few vehicles prisoners have for
informing the communty about their existence and, in these days
of strife in our correctional institutions, the plight of prisoners is
a matter of urgent public concern. To sustain a policy which chills
ccmmunication on this issue is at odds with the most basic tenets
of the guarantee of freedom of speech.
Id. at 427.
72. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas.
73. See notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text supra.
74. 416 U.S. at 422, 428.
75. See note 71 supra. Two months after the Procunier decision was
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Procunier did not resolve every issue that might have been
raised with regard to prisoner mail. 6 The Court was dealing only
with regulations involving personal mail because the district court
never reached the problem of restrictions on prisoner-attorney cor-
respondence.7 7 Since courts have traditionally been more willing
to protect attorney-client mail than other types of correspondence, 8
there is little reason to suspect that in an appropriate situation the
Supreme Court would not extend its Procunier holding to legal
mail.
79
Procunier achieved the laudable result of eliminating much of
the confusion which had existed in the lower courts regarding cen-
sorship of prisoner mail.80 The case may also be viewed as another
blow to the once-popular hands-off doctrines.8 ' While some might
announced, the Court faced the issue of prisoner first amendment rights
with respect to media interviews. In Pell v. Procunier, -U.S. - (1974),
Justice Stewart stated that "a prison inmate retains those First Amendment
rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Id. at -. It
was held that neither prisoners nor media representatives have a constitu-
tional right to specific face-to-face interviews. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Douglas dissented. Justice Powell concurred with respect to the
Court's holding that prisoners do not have a first amendment right to de-
mand an interview with a willing reporter, but strongly dissented with re-
gard to the Court's refusal to permit the press to request interviews with
specific inmates. His first amendment analysis in Pell closely paralleled
his reasoning in Procunier. See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., - U.S.
- (1974) (companion case to Pell).
76. For example, the Court left open the question of mass mailings.
416 U.S. at 408 n.ll. Recently, a federal district court held that the princi-
ples applicable to mail censorship are equally valid with respect to news-
paper censorship, following the rationale of Procunier. The Luparar v.
Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974).
77. Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Count II of plaintiffs' complaint was rendered moot by In re Jordan, 7 Cal.
3d 930, 500 P.2d 873, 103 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1972), where the California Su-
preme Court held that prisoner-attorney correspondence could not be cen-
sored in light of CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600(2) (West 1970), which provided
that inmates could correspond confidentially with any member of the State
Bar or public office holder, subject to inspection for contraband.
78. Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 1150 (1973). In addition to first amendment
considerations, attorney-client mail brings into play the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee of access to the courts and the sixth amendment's protec-
tion of the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Carothers v. Fol-
lette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
79. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, - U.S. - (1974). In Wolff, the state of
Nebraska contended that attorney mail could be opened by prison authori-
ties in the presence of the inmate and checked for contraband. The Court
did not decide whether any constitutional rights were violated, since it
found that the Nebraska procedure did not infringe upon any right that
might be implicated. Significantly, Nebraska did not assert the right to
read such mail, and the Court noted that there would be no chilling effect
inherent in the procedure. Each member of the Court concurred in Justice
White's opinion regarding the censorship issue.
80. See notes 23-30 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra. Justice Powell,
commendably, stated the rule in a way which places it in its proper context
without impugning the valid judicial policy which it implements.
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object to the Court's failure to decide the case on the basis of pris-
oner first amendment rights, it is clear that corrections officials now
face a heavy burden when attempting to justify rules and regula-
tions which authorize censorship of inmate correspondence. Even
though personal mail, whether incoming or outgoing, may still be
read by prison employees, the Court in Procunier effectively in-
sured that the prison staff may no longer refuse to mail or deliver
a letter because, for example, it is critical of prison policy or con-
tains statements disrespectful to the warden.82
MrcHA., H. GARuETy
82. See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Caroth-
ers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
CRIMINAL LAW-THE RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO A
PRELIMINARY HEARING WHEN INCARCERATED
IN ANOTHER COUNTY
Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 309 A.2d 824 (1973)
(allocatur denied).
In Commonwealth v. Brabham,' the Pennsylvania Superior
Court considered whether a defendant who is incarcerated in an-
other county can be denied a preliminary hearing in the absence
of an express waiver. The appellant in Brabham was identified
as the person who had robbed Penbrook Manor Cleaners in
Dauphin County in 1970. While the appellant was confined in Lan-
caster County Prison for an unrelated offense, the Dauphin County
District Attorney placed a detainer upon him to prevent him from
fleeing after his release from prison. No preliminary hearing was
held. The Dauphin County Grand Jury returned an indictment
which charged the appellant with aggravated robbery. Asserting
the failure to be granted a preliminary hearing, the appellant pre-
sented a motion to quash the bill of indictment. The court denied
the motion and thereafter the appellant was tried and found guilty.
On appeal the superior court vacated the conviction, quashed the
indictment and discharged the appellant. The court held that the
appellant was entitled to a preliminary hearing as a matter of right
and that incarceration in another county was insufficient justifica-
tion for denying an accused this right.2 In so holding, the court
specifically overruled Commonwealth v. O'Brien3 in which the su-
perior court held that an accused did not have a right to a pre-
liminary hearing when incarcerated in another county.
Originally the purpose of the preliminary hearing was to re-
strict the indiscriminate release of prisoners rather than to protect
the accused. 4 This judicial emphasis upon the preliminary hearing
1. 225 Pa. Super. 331, 309 A.2d 824 (1973).
2. Id. at 338, 309 A.2d at 828.
3. 181 Pa. Super. 382, 124 A.2d 666 (1956). In O'Brien, the appellant
presented a motion to quash his indictment asserting that his failure to be
present at the preliminary hearing was a denial of his right to face his ac-
cusers. The court held that since he was incarcerated in another county he
had no right to be present at the preliminary hearing because he was not
even entitled to demand that a preliminary hearing be granted at all. Id.
at 396, 124 A.2d at 673.
4. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 333, 309 A.2d 824,
825 (1973). The early English statutes creating the preliminary hearing for
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
as a device to ensure that defendants were not indiscriminately re-
leased was summarized by Blackstone in his explanation of the pur-
pose of a preliminary hearing:
If upon this inquiry it manifestly appears that either no
such crime was committed or that the suspicion entertained
of the prisoner was wholly groundless in such case only
is it lawful totally to discharge him.
5
Gradually, however, the preliminary hearing became a protective
device to ensure that the defendant was not charged with an offense
in the absence of "reasonably well founded" evidence presented by
the prosecution. 6 The purpose of the preliminary hearing today
is to ensure that a defendant is not imprisoned for a crime which
was never committed or for a crime for which there is no reasonable
evidence connecting the defendant. 7 The preliminary hearing acts
as a safety valve to ensure that an innocent accused is not unlaw-
fully imprisoned or forced to enter bail for a crime when the prose-
cution does not demonstrate probable cause.8
There were no preliminary hearings or other similar devices
in early common law.9 The preliminary hearing was created by
English statutes10 and these English statutes were incorporated into
the common law of the Commonwealth in the early nineteenth cen-
this purpose were 3 Henry VII, ch. III; 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, ch. III;
2 and 3 Philip and Mary, ch. X.
5. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296.
6. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 21 (1964).
[A] full hearing and investigation of the facts charged [shall
be held] and ... the defendant [shall only be bound over] to the
said court when [the justice of the peace] . . . is satisfied from
the evidence that the prosecution is reasonably well founded.
7. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 396, 124 A.2d 666,
673 (1956).
The essential role of the preliminary hearing in today's criminal justice
system is illustrated in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), where the
United States Supreme Court held that the preliminary hearing is a "critical
stage" of the criminal process. Previously the preliminary hearing had
been held not to be a critical stage in a prosecution. United States ex Tel.
Mathis v. Rundle, 266 F. Supp. 1003, 1007 (E.D. Pa. 1967). This change is
an important factor to consider when attempting to analyze the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court's holding in Brabham in 1973 as opposed to its holding
in O'Brien in 1956.
The Coleman decision is discussed in 75 DICK. L. REv. 143 (1970).
8. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 396, 124 A.2d 666,
613 (1956). For a discussion of the purposes of preliminary hearings in
Pennsylvania, see Comment, Preliminary Hearings in Pennsylvania: A
Closer Look, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 481 (1969).
9. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 332, 309 A.2d 824,
825 (1973).
10. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
tury.11 There is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing;
12
therefore, the question facing the superior court in both Brabham
and O'Brien was whether there is a statutory or common law right
to a preliminary hearing in Pennsylvania.13
Pennsylvania common law requires that an accused be granted
a preliminary hearing with these three exceptions:
14
1. If an accused has fled or is about to flee the juris-
diction and haste is required.
2. A grand jury makes a presentment based on per-
sonal knowledge without any bill of indictment having
been laid before it.
3. A prosecutor submits an investigating grand jury
presentment to an indicting grand jury with leave of court.
These three exceptions do not deny a defendant equal protection
and are constitutional.1 5 The court in both Brabham and O'Brien
recognized the validity of these exceptions. The court in O'Brien
recognized that incarceration in another county could not be equated
to being a fugitive which would make one of the exceptions appli-
cable. 16 However, the court in O'Brien felt that the same procedure
could be followed when an accused is incarcerated in another
county as is followed when the fugitive exception applies; 17 there-
fore, a preliminary hearing need not be granted in either situation.' 8
11. 3 Binn. 616, 620 (Pa. 1807). The method by which these English
statutes were incorporated into the law of the Commonwealth is described
in detail in Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 391-92, 124 A.2d
666,671 (1956):
Doubt having arisen ... as to which English statutes ...
should be considered as a part of the law of this Commonwealth,
the legislature, by the Act of April 7, 1807, directed the judges of
the Supreme Court to report to the legislature which of the English
statutes were then in force in this Commonwealth. In the report
made by the judges found in the appendix of 3 Binney's Report 616,
620, there were included three of the above acts: the statute of
Third Henry VII, Chapter 3, the statute of 1st and 2nd Philip &
Mary, Chapter 13, and the statute of 2nd & 3rd Philip & Mary,
Chapter 10. These statutes thus became a part of the law of this
Commonwealth, and constitute the basic authority for our prelimi-
nary hearings.
12. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 587 (1913); Goldsby v. United
States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895).
13. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 337-38, 309 A.2d
824, 827; Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 387, 124 A.2d 666,
669 (1956).
14. Commonwealth v. Green, 126 Pa. 531, 537-38, 17 A. 878, 879-80
(1889). These three exceptions were outlined in Commonwealth v. Brab-
ham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 333 n.1, 309 A.2d 824, 825 n.1 (1973).
15. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 131-32, 277 A.2d 764,
770-71 (1971). It is also valid to have a coroner's inquest rather than a pre-
liminary hearing. Commonwealth ex rel. Walls v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 290,
294, 205 A.2d 862, 864 (1965).
16. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 395-96, 124 A.2d 666,
673 (1956).
17. Id. Becoming a fugitive acts as a waiver by the accused of the
right to a preliminary hearing.
i 18. This reasoning was followed in Commonwealth v. Czarnecki, 221
Pa. Super. 303, 292 A.2d 422 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Green v. Myers,
197 Pa. Super. 545, 180 A.2d 265 (1962).
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The court in Brabham refused to follow the reasoning in O'Brien
and held that although the fugitive exception is valid, the reasoning
and justification for that exception is not applicable to the situation
where the accused is incarcerated in another county. 19
The court in Brabham placed greater reliance on the mandatory
nature of the preliminary hearing in the statutory scheme of Penn-
sylvania than did the court in O'Brien. The statute concerning
preliminary hearings in effect at the time of the O'Brien decision
granted the accused a right to be heard at the preliminary hearing
if "the person accused shall so demand."20  Although this statute
was later held to entitle a defendant to a preliminary hearing as
a "positive legal right" if demanded,2 1 the court in O'Brien did not
feel it mandated granting the accused a preliminary hearing when
incarcerated in another county.22 The court in Brabham, however,
felt that the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure23 require
that an accused be granted a preliminary hearing in Pennsylvania
unless the hearing is waived or unless one of the three traditional
exceptions applies.24 The court in Brabham held that the exception
in O'Brien where the accused is incarcerated in another county is
not one of the traditional exceptions, nor does incarceration act as
19. Commonwealth v. Brabliam, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 338, 309 A.2d 824,
827-28 (1973). The fugitive exception did not originate in Pennsylvania but
was contained in 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *318:
[Where an accused] hath fled or secrets himself in capital cases,
or hath not in smaller misdemeanors been bound over to appear
at the assizes or sessions still an indictment may be preferred
against him in his absence.
'When the accused is a fugitive he is to blame for not being granted a
preliminary hearing; therefore, this exception is well founded. This reason-
ing is illustrated in Commonwealth ex rel. Blackman v. Banmiller, 405 Pa.
560, 176 A.2d 682, 683 (1962):
Relator cannot complain that he had no preliminary hearing before
indictment when his own disappearance and self-initiated absence
made a preliminary hearing impossible.
However, where an accused is incarcerated in another county the rea-
soning behind the fugitive exception does not seem to apply because the
accused is not intentionally absenting himself from the jurisdiction of the
court.
The fugitive exception was held not to be applicable when the accused
was incarcerated on a different charge within the same county. Common-
wealth v. Duncan, 16 Cumb. L.J. 113 (Pa. Q.S. 1966).
20. Act of May 14, 1915, P.L. 499 [1915] (suspended 1972).
21. Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 396 Pa. 491, 497, 152 A.2d 726, 729
(1959).
22. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 396, 124 A.2d 666,
673 (1956).
23. PA. R. CRIM. P. These rules became effective March 20, 1972, and
were significantly revised by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1973.
These revisions became effective January 1, 1974.
24. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 334-35, 309 A.2d
824, 826 (1973).
a waiver.2 5 Therefore, although not constitutionally required, the
court held that in Pennsylvania a preliminary hearing is required
except in a few very limited factual situations.
20
The holding in Brabham is more consistent with the intent of
the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 27 than would be the
judicial retention of the O'Brien exception. Although rule 2,28
which defines the purpose and construction of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure, could be cited in support of either
Judge Hoffman's majority opinion in Brabham or Judge Watkins'
dissenting opinion in Brabham, rule 140 is more supportative of the
majority position:
(a) At the preliminary arraignment the issuing au-
thority shall ... inform the defendant:
(2) of his right to have a preliminary hearing or,
except as provided in these rules, waive it....
(f) When a preliminary hearing is not waived, the is-
suing authority shall:
(1) fix a day and hour for a preliminary hearing
29
The editorial comment to Rule 22430 also supports Judge Hoffman's
majority position: "An accused in Pennsylvania usually has the
right to a preliminary hearing before he may be indicted by a grand
25. Id. Judge Watkins in his dissenting opinion in Brabham felt that
the O'Brien exception was one of the traditional exceptions. Id. at 344, 309
A'2d at 830. If the majority had held that the O'Brien exception was one
of the traditional exceptions then Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117,
277 A.2d 764 (1971), would have been applicable. The court in McCloskey
held that the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure did not supercede
any of the traditional exceptions to the requirement for a preliminary hear-
ing. Id. at 129, 277 A.2d at 770.
26. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 338, 309 A.2d 824,
827 (1973).
27. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
28. PA. R. CRIM. P. 2.
These rules are intended to provide for the just determination
of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay as nearly as may be in
consonance with the rules of statutory construction.
Id.
To support elimination of the O'Brien exception one could emphasize
the language "just determination" and "fairness," while to support retention
of the O'Brien exception one could emphasize "simplicity in procedure" and
"elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."
29. PA. R. CRIM. P. 140 (effective January 1, 1974). Judge Hoffman
cited this rule in support of his position in Brabhan.
30. PA. R. Canw. P. 224.
When the attorney for the Commonwealth certifies to the Court
of Common Pleas that a preliminary hearing cannot be held for a
defendant because the defendant cannot be found in the Common-
wealth or that the statute of limitations will run prior to the time
when a preliminary hearing can be held or that a preliminary hear-
ing cannot be held for other good cause, the court may grant leave
to the attorney for the Commonwealth to present a bill of indict-




jury."31  Judge Hoffman's holding establishes that these rules, as
well as the common law, are intended to make the preliminary
hearing an essential stage in criminal prosecutions in the Common-
wealth.
Although Judge Hoffman and Judge Watkins disagree in other
areas in Brabham, the key issue of disagreement is whether the
preliminary hearing is of much actual value to the accused. In this
dissenting opinion, Judge Watkins agreed with the Common-
wealth 2 which urged that no substantial harm was incurred by
the defendant from the denial of a preliminary hearing. 3 The
Commonwealth argued that since the appellant was already in
prison and the purpose of the preliminary hearing is to prevent
unlawful incarceration, the appellant suffered no harm.34 In re-
jecting this argument, Judge Hoffman adopts a broader view of the
purpose of the preliminary hearing 3 as explained by the United
States Supreme Court in Coleman v. Alabama:
Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary
hearingis essential to protect the indigent accused against
erroneous or improper prosecution.... [T]he lawyer's
skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses
may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case . .. [or]
fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examina-
tion . . . at trial . . . [or] discover the case the State has
against the client and make possible the preparation of a
proper defense . . . [or effectively argue for] the necessity
for an early psychiatric examination or bail."'
Judge Watkins argues that the benefits stated in Coleman are over-
31. Id., Comment. This comment prevents the language of Rule 224
from being interpreted in such a way as to enable preliminary hearings to
be dispensed with by means of a liberal interpretation by the courts of the
language "other good cause." For the complete text of the rule, see note
30 sunra.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 122 which requires a preliminary arraignment and
PA. R. CruM. P. 130 which requires an immediate preliminary hearing for
an accused arrested without a warrant also support the majority position
in Brabham.
32. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 338, 309 A.2d 824,
828 (1973).
33. ld. at 341, 309 A.2d at 829 (dissenting opinion).
34. Brief for Appellee at 7-8, Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa.
Super. 331, 309 A.2d 824 (1973).
35. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 337, 309 A.2d 824,
827 (1973).
The court in Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 396, 124
A.2d 666, 673 (1956) adopted the more narrow view of the purpose of a pre-
liminary hearing, which was a determining factor in that decision.
36. 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970). The rights of the accused at preliminary
hearings in Pennsylvania are stated in PA. R. CiUM. P. 141 (effective Janu-
ary 1, 1974).
emphasized,8 7 as was admitted by Justice Brennan, the writer of the
majority opinion in Coleman, in his opinion in Adams v. Illinois. 5
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure support the view
of Judge Hoffman because if the preliminary hearing were of such
little value to the accused, it would not occupy such a prominent
position in the Pennsylvania statutory scheme of criminal proce-
dure.3 9
Judge Watkins in his dissenting opinion disputes the validity
of Judge Hoffman's reliance on statutory authority for the majority
opinion's conclusion that the appellant has a right to a preliminary
hearing.40 Judge Watkins states that the statutes are not self-exe-
cuting and the rights must be demanded by the accused.41 Judge
Watkins also states that the refusal of the lower court to quash the
indictment should not be reversed unless there was an "abuse of
discretion both manifest and flagrant."42  The dissent further
states that the denial of a preliminary hearing is not only harmless
error but also beneficial to a defendant in some cases.
43
Judge Watkins did not refer to the practice in federal courts
with reference to preliminary hearings but the federal practice sup-
ports his decision. Although an accused has a right to a preliminary
hearing under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 44 if the
accused is indicted by a grand jury the issue of his right to a pre-
liminary hearing becomes moot.45 Where an accused is presently
37. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 342 n.2, 309 A.2d
824, 829-30 n.2 (1973) (dissenting opinion). This view is supported by
Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 138, 277 A.2d 764, 775 (1971)
where the advantages of a preliminary hearing to a defendant are referred
to as "illusory."
38. 405 U.S. 278, 282 (1971).
39. For a discussion of PA. R. Cam. P., see notes 27-31 and accompany-
ing text supra. The majority view in Brabham is the better position despite
the statement in Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 396, 124 A.2d
666, 673 (1956):
It is not necessary to have a preliminary hearing in order to furnish
information to the prisoner of the offense charged including the
time, place, and circumstances involved. This information becomes
available to him in the indictment and if not sufficiently detailed
he can obtain through the court a bill of particulars to further en-
able him to prepare his defense.
Although the above statement from O'Brien is generally true the pre-
liminary hearing may be much more valuable to a defendant and his attor-
ney than the indictment and bill of particulars because at the preliminary
hearing the witnesses may be cross-examined and that evidence uncovered
at a preliminary hearing may demonstrate that an indictment is unneces-
sary.
40. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 340-41, 309 A.2d
824, 829 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
41. Id,
42. Id. at 341, 309 A.2d at 829.
43. Id. at 341-42, 309 A.2d at 829. For Judge Hoffman's view that the
denial of a preliminary hearing is not harmless error, see notes 35, 36 and
39 and accompanying text supra.
44. See FEi. R. CaIM. P. 5(c) which states that "[a] defendant is enti-
tled to a preliminary examination unless waived."
45. United States v. Barone, 311 F. Supp. 496, 498 (W.D. Pa. 1970). Any
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in prison he may be indicted by a federal grand jury with no re-
quirement that a preliminary hearing be granted.4" However,
Judge Hoffman emphasized that the court was determining only the
Pennsylvania position on this issue and, therefore, the Pennsylvania
statutory scheme was determinative.
47
Judge Watkins feels that if the O'Brien exception is to be
eliminated from the law of Pennsylvania it should be done by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court acting within the power granted by
the Pennsylvania Constitution.48 In this regard, he states:
Without suggesting whether or not any change in this prac-
tice should be made by statute or procedural rules, we
firmly believe that it should not be done by judicial fiat.'
9
Judge Watkins also outlines the criteria he feels should be used
in the determination whether the O'Brien exception should be
eliminated from Pennsylvania law:
IT] he advantages to the defendant referred to in McClos-
key as illusory and as "a highly speculative de minimus
advantage" [should be weighed] against the dangers, de-
lays, and expense of transporting across the state those
who, by the nature of multiple offenses in different coun-
ties, are often the most desperate and dangerous prison-
ers.50
However, by denying allocatur 51 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
seems to agree with Judge Hoffman that the O'Brien decision is
not consistent with the statutory scheme of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Criminal Procedure and should be overruled.
The Brabham decision should end the differences in pro-
cedural approach followed by the counties of the Commonwealth
when presented with the situation of an accused incarcerated in
another county.5 2 Despite the costs, dangers 8 and number of per-
possible error resulting from a denial of the right of an accused to be
granted a preliminary hearing is cured by a subsequent indictment of the
accused. Although this holding has not been overruled, an argument may
be made that the holding in Coleman that a preliminary hearing is a "criti-
cal stage" of a criminal prosecution may cause federal courts to reconsider
this issue.
46. Yodock v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 307, 310 (M.D. Pa. 1951).
47. See notes 23-31 and accompanying text supra.
43. PA. CONsT. art. V, § 10(c) grants to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court the power to promulgate procedural rules. It was under this author-
ity that the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure were issued.
49. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 345, 309 A.2d 824,
831 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
50. Id.
51. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa. Super. 331, 309 A.2d 824 (1973)
(allocatur denied).
52. The court in Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 393, 124
A.2d 666, 672 (1956) describes the different approaches of the counties:
sonnel required, the accused who is incarcerated in another county
must be removed from the prison 54 and granted a preliminary hear-
ing unless the accused waives this right. Whether an accused who
is incarcerated in another state must be granted a preliminary hear-
ing is not answered by the Brabham decision but it seems that he
does have such a right despite the complications that extradition
will cause. In spite of the obvious administrative problems"5 caused
by the decision, Brabham is a sound decision because an accused
who would not otherwise have been granted a preliminary hearing
is now entitled to one as a matter of right. If grand jury indict-
ments are eliminated by counties within the Commonwealth in the
near future,5" the preliminary hearing will increase in importance
as a protective device to ensure that an accused is not indicted and
tried unless the prosecution can demonstrate probable cause that
the accused committed the offense.
KIM R. GIBsoN
In some counties the district attorney has the court issue a writ
of habeas corpus ad respondendum in all cases where the defendant
is a prisoner in another county and, unless waived by the defend-
ant, brings him before the magistrate for a preliminary hearing. In
other counties the district attorney... holds a hearing in the ab-
sence of the defendant, has a return made by the magistrate and
presents an indictment on the basis of the return without first ob-
taining permission of the court. In still other counties ... permis-
sion is obtained from the court to present the bill to the grand jury.
Still another practice sometimes followed is to hold no preliminary
hearing and to secure indictment through a district attorney's bill,
presented always of course, only after permission from court.
53. See note 50 and accompanying text supra for Judge Watkins' ap-
praisal of these costs and dangers.
54. PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 12, § 1887 (1967) allows the district attorney
to remove the accused from prison in order to grant him a preliminary hear-
ing.
55. See notes 50 and 53 and accompanying text supra.
56. PA. CONST. art. I. § 10 (amend. 1973) authorizes courts of common
pleas to provide for the initiation of criminal charges by information.
Except as hereinafter provided no person shall, for any indict-
able offense, be proceeded against criminally by information, ex-
cept in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia,
when in actual service, in time of war or public danger, or by leave
of the court for oppression or misdemeanor in office. Each of the
several courts of common pleas may, with the approval of the Su-
preme Court, provide for the initiation of criminal proceedings
therein by information filed in the manner provided by law. No
person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall private property be taken or applied to public
use, without authority or law and without just compensation being
first made or secured.
This constitutional amendment was adopted by a majority of the elec-
torate on November 6, 1973 and Governor Shapp issued a proclamation an-
nouncing its adoption on December 21, 1973. See 4 Pa. B. 35 for the text
of this proclamation.
